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Abstract
After the success of Anti-Japanese war, China faced the 
threats of “civil war, dictatorship and splitting”. KMT 
and CPC conducted Chongqing Negotiation to establish 
a coalition government to lead the post-war political 
development. However, due to KMT’s political strategy of 
civil war, it attempted to wipe out CPC while negotiating. 
In response to KMT’s civil war strategy, CPC adopted the 
political strategy of fighting a war while negotiating, and 
striving for the intermediary powers to counter it. Finally, the 
results achieved in Chongqing Negotiation were submerged 
in the full-blown civil war between KMT and CPC.
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INTRODUCTION
After the success of Anti-Japanese war, China faced the 
threats of “civil war, dictatorship and splitting”. The policy 
of “peace, democracy and solidarity” put forward by the 
CPC Central Committee has been generally recognized 
by the society. KMT and CPC signed the October 10th 
Agreement in Chongqing Negotiation, which confirmed 
the policy of “peace, democracy and solidarity” and the 
democratic process as the basic trend of the post-war 
political development in China. However, due to the rise 
of KMT authoritarian force, it exposed its political stance 
of stubbornly adhering to one-party dictatorship, personal 
dictatorship and civil war, seriously violated the spirit of 
five agreements of the Political Consultative Conference, 
undermined the peaceful and democratic process, broke 
the basis of KMT-CPC cooperation, abandoned the 
possibility of peace negotiation unilaterally, and resulted 
in China’s falling into the abyss of full-blown civil war.
1 .   C H O N G Q I N G  N E G O T I AT I O N : 
DOMESTIC CONSENSUS OF “PEACE, 
DEMOCRACY AND SOLIDARITY”
On August 28th, 1938 afternoon, the delegation of CPC 
by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei, etc. 
accompanied by Hurley and Zhang Zhizhong arrived in 
Chongqing from Yan’an by flight. KMT and CPC started 
negotiations from Auguat 29th and signed the October 10th 
Agreement on October 10th, lasting 43 days. According to 
the relevant issues and progress, the negotiations can be 
divided into three stages:
The first stage: exchange of views (August 29th 
to September 3rd): The leaders of the two parties met 
directly, established the principle of negotiation; the 
representatives of the two parties had free exchanges on 
the issues of negotiation necessity, principles, guidelines, 
procedures and contents, etc.. On the first day of the 
negotiation, Jiang Jieshi firstly proposed that “China does 
not have a civil war”, trying to deny the legitimacy of the 
Chinese Communist army. Mao Zedong immediately cited 
a large number of facts in decades of civil war and the 
Sino-Japanese War to refute, “Saying that China has no 
civil war is a deceit.” (CPC Central Committee Literature, 
para.2, 1994, p.17) 
Against the six requirements in the  Declaration on the 
Current Political Situation published by CPC, Jiang Jieshi 
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made three principles to the KMT representatives: a). 
Must not discuss the issue of government reorganization 
in addition to the governance of existing government, 
namely, hold so-called party conferences, discuss national 
affairs or organize a coalition government; b) Must not 
solve problems by stages or in part, but solve all problems 
in one time; c) Because of the unity of government decree 
and military command, all problems shall be resolved 
around this center (Taipei National Museum of History, 
2011, p.377). This has set the tone for the expected 
negotiation and results for Kuomintang.
On August 30th, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai drew 
up 11 programs for Chongqing Negotiation, namely: 
achieve unification of China based on peace, democracy 
and solidarity; support Mr. Jiang, acknowledge Mr. 
Jiang’s leadership in China; recognize KMT, CPC and 
the equal legal status of Anti-Japanese parties; recognize 
the achievements and legal status of the forces in the 
liberated areas and local authorities in the Sino-Japanese 
War; punish traitors, dissolve puppet armies; cease all 
armed conflicts; democratize politics; re-elect the National 
Assembly; implement local self-government; troops in the 
liberated areas should be reorganized into 48 armies and 
16 divisions; establish Peking administrative office and 
northern political committee (CPC Central Committee 
Literature, para.2, 1994, pp.18-19). They prepared to 
submit the programs to KMT to define CPC’s position and 
negotiation direction, test the attitude of KMT and gain 
the reply. On September 3rd, the CPC representatives Zhou 
Enlai and Wang Ruofei formally proposed the above 11 
programs to the KMT representatives.
The second stage: negotiations on details (September 
4th to October 5th). Within the framework of the above-
mentioned “three principles” and “four points” of Jiang 
Jieshi, “eight principles” of Mao Zedong, based on the 
“eleven programs” of CPC, the representatives of the 
two parties had negotiations on specific issues. Within 32 
days, Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei carried out 12 rounds 
of difficult negotiations with the KMT representatives and 
some democrats including Zhang Qun, Shao Lizi, Zhang 
Zhizhong, Zhang Lisheng and Ye Chucang, etc..
The third stage: Agreements have been signed 
and confirmed (October 6th to October 10th). The 
achievements of Chongqing Negotiation include the 
peaceful founding principle, political consultative 
conference, national assembly (postponed, old represents 
are valid but the number needs to be increased), partisan 
legalization, political democratization, nationalization of 
army, equal cooperation between parties and other issues. 
CPC has achieved many results by carrying out extensive 
wok to cooperate with the negotiations. For example, 
from September 10th to October 12th, the Eighth Route 
Army 129th division decisively and fruitfully fought 
back Yan Xishan army’s large-scale provocation in 
Shangdang area; During the negotiations in Chongqing, 
Mao Zedong spared all time and took every opportunity 
to meet, visit and condole people of all social circles 
at home and abroad, including Kuomintang members, 
nationalist government officials (including the resolute 
anti-communist Chen brothers), leaders and members 
of the main middle parties, ordinary people, industrial 
workers, ambassadors to China (consuls) and even 
ordinary soldiers, listened to opinions and suggestions 
widely on the KMT-CPC negotiation and domestic 
political situation, and actively promoted CPC’s policy 
and advocacy of “peace, democracy and solidarity”. 
All these efforts jointly promoted the unsatisfactory 
negotiation outcome to be reached by KMT and CPC. 
On October 10th, in the living room of Guiyuan, No. 
107, Zhongshansi Road, the representatives of KMT 
and CPC including Wang Shijie, Zhang Qun, Zhang 
Zhizhong, Shao Lizi, Zhou Enlai and Wang Ruofei 
signed successively on the Minutes of the Meeting 
between the Government and the Representatives of CPC 
(also known as the October 10th Agreement) which was 
drafted by Zhou Enlai. Next day, Mao Zedong and Wang 
Ruofei flied back to Yan’an by accompany of Zhang 
Zhizhong.
2.  POLITICAL MODE OF BUILDING A 
COALITION GOVERNMENT
From January 10th to 31st 1946, the Political Consultative 
Conference of KMT, CPC, the Democratic League, 
the Youth Party and community leaders was held in 
Chongqing. Under the joint efforts of CPC, middle parties 
and personages without party affiliation, this conference 
has identified the post-war democratic political system 
based on the Chinese regime of parliamentary system, 
cabinet system and provincial autonomism, confirmed the 
peaceful democratic new procedure mode from tutelage to 
constitutionalism, and defined the principles, approaches 
and objectives for the post-war political development of 
China.
2.1  CPC Implemented the Political Strategy of 
“Fight Wars While Negotiating”
After Chongqing Negotiation, although the negotiations 
between KMT and CPC continued, the US policy changed 
from “foster Jiang and use CPC” during the war to “support 
Jiang and suppress CPC”; Jiang Jieshi never gave up the 
attempt to suppress CPC, but it’s also impossible for him 
to defy the public will, publicly tear up the October 10th 
Agreement and launch a brutal civil war. Therefore, during 
this time there was a co-existence of peace and war in the 
relationship between KMT and CPC, namely temporarily 
leant to peace, temporarily leant to war, war brewed in 
peace, and peace brewed in war. In view of this situation, 
CPC decided to negotiate based on the basic policy of 
opposing civil war, fighting for democracy and peace, and 
implemented the political strategy of “negotiating while 
fighting a war”.
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Under the organization, leadership and active 
promotion of the Southern Bureau, people of all social 
circles in Chongqing and in the rear area increasingly 
called for democracy, called for a speedy convening of 
the political Consultative Conference, establishment of 
a democratic coalition government and solvation of the 
major national problems. After Chongqing Negotiation, 
the Chinese people’s movements for abolition of KMT 
one-party dictatorship, opposition to civil war, and 
seeking peace and democracy rose one after another. In 
this regard, KMT government took the repressive policy 
of spy ruling, but the Southern Bureau actively organized 
the movements of anti-civil war, anti-dictatorship and 
seeking democracy. In mid-November 1945, under the 
promotion of CPC, leaders of various middle parties in 
Chongqing including Zhang Lan, Shen Junru and Huang 
Yanpei, etc. initiated to establish “Anti-Civil War Union 
of All Social Circles in the Provisional Capital” and on 
the 19th held an anti-civil war conference attended by 
500 people in the Southwest Industrial Building, calling 
on people of all social circles and taxpayers to strike, 
boycott classes, refuse to participate in civil war or pay 
taxes, take their own practical actions to stop the civil 
war, to promote the earliest establishment of a coalition 
government and lay foundation for a lasting domestic 
peace.
2.2  Confirmation on the Policy of the Coalition 
Government
From internal logic of the five agreements of the Political 
Consultative Conference, or the procedure design, the 
Political Consultative Conference identified a new mode 
to realize democratic politics under the current situation. 
That is, firstly develop a common program in the Political 
Consultative Conference; then reorganize Kuomintang 
government based on the common program, making it 
a coalition government co-organized by all parties; the 
coalition government convene a national assembly, make 
a constitution; finally, according to the constitution, 
establish a democratically elected government, implement 
constitutionalism and lead the national construction. In 
accordance with the principles of the procedural law, 
this procedure must be completed gradually in due 
order; if any step is omitted or the order is reversed, it 
will be illegal. This procedure mode is consistent with 
the traditional advocacy of CPC on the final direction of 
election and democracy, but in view of the realities of 
division of various political forces and possible outbreak 
of civil war, it was adjusted according to the step design 
for coalition government proposed by Mao Zedong. 
Therefore, it is a new procedure mode different from 
the democratic procedure mode of Europe, USA and 
the Soviet Union, and also different from the previous 
democratic procedure mode of CPC. This mode, after one 
and a half years’ repeated struggles, has been eventually 
approved by all parties in the Political Consultative 
Conference. This mode also affects the content of 
substantive laws, namely, replace electoral democracy 
with deliberative democracy, set up a temporary party 
coalition government as a transitional form to guide 
China’s democratic process to fundamental democratic 
election, and establish a democratically elected 
government. This mode, undoubtedly, was far-reaching 
for its Chinese characteristics, and was called by CPC 
and middle parties as the line of Political Consultative 
Conference. Since the Political Consultative Conference 
was held under a circumstance without a constitution 
or a democratically elected government, in accordance 
with one of the connotations of democratic politics, 
namely the specification of political party politics, by 
the negotiation result of the two largest political parties 
in China at the time and attended by all major political 
parties as well as independents to determine the future 
democratic politics of China, it reflected far more 
comprehensive and adequate opinions of the pubic than 
KMT and its government, and legally, its level should 
be higher than the KMT government. As a concentrated 
reflection of wills of various political parties, its 
agreements should be higher than the laws published 
by the KMT government in legal level and have the 
highest authority. This determines the legitimacy of 
achieving democratic politics in accordance with the 
mode specified by the Political Consultative Conference, 
namely the line of the Conference, and also determines 
that if violate this mode, namely the line of the 
Conference, it will be illegal (Hu, 2008, pp.336-337).
3.  KMT’S POLITICAL STRATEGY OF 
CIVIL WAR AND RUPTURE OF THE 
SECOND KMT-CPC COOPERATION
Political Consultative Conference, as a blueprint for 
the post-war democratic constitutionalism in China, 
reflects the time theme of “democratic unity, peaceful 
reconstruction”, and meets ordinary people’s expectation 
for peace and democracy. However, the Second Plenary 
Session of the Sixth KMT Central Committee totally 
neglected the resolutions of the Political Consultative 
Conference, conducted a series of retroactions including 
dispatching troops in the Northeast China and illegally 
convening a “National Assembly”, which not only 
exposed its political stance of stubbornly adhering to the 
established policies of one-party dictatorship, personal 
dictatorship and civil war, but also seriously violated the 
spirit of five agreements of the Political Consultative 
Conference, undermined the peaceful and democratic 
process, shook the foundation of KMT-CPC cooperation, 
completely unilaterally closed the door of peaceful talks, 
and made China fall into the abyss of full-blown civil 
war.
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3.1  KMT’s Dictatorship and CPC’s “Parliamentary 
Struggle”
Signing of five agreements of the Conference and closure 
of the meetings made the war-torn Chinese people see a 
dawn to build a peaceful, united and democratic China. 
The CPC Central Committee sincerely approved and 
supported the conference resolutions, not only authorized 
the delegation to sign various agreements, but also 
made the important judgment that “from now on China 
steps onto a new phase of peaceful and democratic 
construction” (CPC Central Committee Party, para.3, 
1987, p.186). For this purpose, CPC has made a political 
strategy to mainly lead people’s movements and insist 
on parliamentary struggles during the period. On 
February 1st, 1946, the CPC Central Committee issued An 
Instruction on the Current Situation and Tasks, clarifying 
that because of the conclusion of five resolutions and the 
gradual implementation, KMT’s one-party dictatorship 
and Jiang Jieshi’s dictatorship would come to an end, 
and China would embark on a new phase of peaceful and 
democratic construction; Therefore, the main struggle 
form of Chinese revolution led by CPC “now has been 
transformed into unarmed parliament struggles from 
the armed struggles, and the domestic problems shall be 
resolved by political means. The Party’s all work must 
adapt to this new situation.” (CPC Central Committee 
Literature, para.2, 1994, p.55)  On February 9th when 
Mao Zedong talked with the Associated Press reporters, 
he publicly stated, “Political Consultative Conference’s 
results are satisfactory and exciting, but we will still 
prepare for the upcoming disaster. I believe all obstacles 
can be removed.” 
In general, China has completed the task of stepping onto the 
democratic stage. During the period of the envoy Marshall 
promoted China to stop the civil war, promoted China’s unity, 
peace and democracy, his efforts cannot be underestimated. 
In fact, China’s restoring peace and establishing a democratic 
government is also favorable to the world. 
“Every party’s current task should focus on fulfilling 
various resolutions of the Political Consultative 
Conference, organizing a constitutional government 
and implementing economic revival. CPC is preparing 
to contribute to this task.” (Ibid., p.56) Therefore, the 
CPC Central Committee frankly, clearly and completely 
indicated the principles, policies and implementary steps 
to be executed after the Political Consultative Conference 
at home and abroad.
During the Political Consultative Conference session, 
the CPC Central Committee Chongqing Bureau (restored 
name of the Southern Bureau after December 1945) 
routinely mobilized the masses and various political 
forces to support and cooperate with the Conference. For 
example, in order to promote success of the Conference, 
various political parties set up a provisional capital 
promotion association, which gave daily lectures or 
reports in the Cangbai hall, invited deputies to report the 
conference progress, and promoted the advocacy of peace 
and democracy. KMT constantly sent spies to trouble the 
venue, abuse, beat the hosts and audiences, track and insult 
the deputies. Especially when Liang Shuming made report 
on January 19th, 1946, KMT spies created mayhem for five 
times, shouted out “support KMT” and “Down with other 
parties”, etc., causing flying rocks and firecrackers in the 
hall. Many people were injured and the speech couldn’t 
continue. In the night when “Jiaochangkou Massacre” 
took place, China Democratic League called the Political 
Consultative Conference delegates to hold an emergency 
meeting. More than ten people including Zhou Enlai, 
Deng Yingchao, Sun Ke and Shao Lizi, etc. attended the 
meeting. Zhou Enlai, Zhang Junmai, Chen Qitian and Li 
Zhuchen were elected to negotiate with Jiang Jieshi, and 
a joint protest letter signed by Shen Junru, Zhang Junmai, 
Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, Wang Ruofei, Li Zhuchen, 
Liang Shuming, Zhang Bojun, Zhang Shenfu and Luo 
Longji was brought to Jiang Jieshi. If above violation 
of the Conference agreement is an individual action by 
a particular group of KMT, considering maintaining the 
overall situation, CPC adopted a policy of distinction. 
However, with the opening of the Second Plenary Session 
of KMT Sixth Central Committee and the Second Session 
of the Fourth Political Council and formation of the 
resolutions, KMT began to totally break the resolutions of 
the Political Consultative Conference, destroyed the post-
war democratic political process in China, and stubbornly 
restarted the political strategy of “one-party dictatorship 
and personal dictatorship”.
3.2  KMT’s Political Strategy Is to “Negotiate 
While Fighting a War” With CPC
When KMT Second Plenary Session tore up the Political 
Consultative Conference agreements, resulting in draft 
constitution amendment and government reorganization 
falling into a deadlock, there were also intense armed 
conflicts between KMT and CPC on the Northeast China 
problem.
After the Political Consultative Conference, CPC’s 
policy on the Northeast China problem was to uphold 
political negotiations, but it was assertively rejected 
by KMT. On March 27th, KMT and CPC signed the 
Agreement to Mediate Armistice in Northeast China, 
providing that 
a) The executive group’s mandate is limited to military 
mediations; b) The group should work in the government army 
and the region where CPC forces stationed, and avoid entering 
the region where the Soviet army stationed; c) The group should 
go to the conflict sites or the sites where the government army 
and CPC forces have intense fires, and make any necessary and 
fair mediation to stop the conflict. 
Two points in the annex: “a) On the Northeast 
military issue, the three people conference shall continue 
negotiations; b) The Northeast political issue shall be 
discussed separately for a fast solution” (Qin, 1981, p.320). 
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Therefore, a peaceful settlement between the two sides on 
Northeast China was not without a slim chance.
Af terwards ,  when J iang  J iesh i  rece ived  the 
commitment  f rom USA government  of  fur ther 
transporting 50,000 soldiers to the Northeast China, 
hits attitude became more aggressive and on April 
1st, he began to categorically deny that Northeast 
problem belonged to domestic affairs in the National 
Political Council, denied the basic facts of Northeast 
Democratic Allied Army and Northeast democratically 
elected government,  accused CPC’s proposal of 
peacefully resolving the Northeast problem as “seeking 
interest of a private party and ignoring survival of 
the country.” (Chongqing City CPPCC Committee, 
para.4, 1985, pp.1538-1541) Jiang Jieshi’s irresponsible 
speech angered CPC’s leaders, and CPC quickly 
adjusted the policy on the Northeast to “promote 
negotiations by fighting”. On April 5th, the CPC Central 
Committee sent a telegraph to Zhou Enlai, requiring 
to “make comprehensive plan to smash attacks of 
the reactionaries” on the Northeast problem, “should 
prepare for big battles, do not fancy that KMT will make 
concessions” (CPC Central Committee Literature, para.2, 
1998, p.672). The next day, Jiang Jieshi gave orders 
twice to Xiong Shihui, “our army should concentrate all 
efforts to deploy the most powerful force to the North, 
in order to firstly destroy the CPC troops at south of 
Siping Street,” “the Northeast should concentrate all 
powers to break CPC forces at south of Siping street, 
then it will be easy to take over the Northeast.” (Taipei 
National Museum of History, 2011, p.281, 287) Since 
then, KMT and the CPC both took military means to 
resolve the Northeast problem, thus a large-scale civil 
war was ignited in Northeast China. On June 26th 1946, 
KMT army attacked CPC’s central China liberated area, 
leading to a full outbreak of civil war. Thus, the second 
civil war replaced the second KMT-CPC cooperation.
In summary, the second KMT-CPC cooperation ended 
in war, and KMT chose the political policy of a full-blown 
civil war. Jiang Jieshi finally claimed that CPC was the 
real enemy of KMT, and to completely eliminate CPC, 
they would launch comprehensive struggles in politics, 
economy, culture, education and all aspects of the society. 
In other words, KMT had no intention of peace talks, 
but determined to speak by military strength to achieve 
the political goals. CPC had to adjust political strategies, 
although still made efforts for negotiations, which 
could only be a cooperation for the actual big battles. 
In fact CPC’s political strategy for the establishment 
of a coalition government of “peace, democracy and 
solidarity” has never changed.
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